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Título: En busca de una explicación del Efecto Secuencial de Compatibilidad. 
Resumen: Se estudia la modulación del Efecto de Compatibilidad (EC) según 
la compatibilidad del ensayo previo (Efecto Secuencial de Compatibilidad, ESC) 
en tres tipos de tareas atencionales, flancos verbal, flancos numérico y 
Stroop espacial, modeladas a partir de Gratton et al., (1992). Las tareas de 
flancos y Stroop espacial presentan diferente complejidad cognitiva. Se ana-
liza en estas tareas si la modulación del EC está matizada por la repetición 
de estímulos exactamente iguales consecutivos (puras réplicas) o es inde-
pendiente de ésta. Se registran datos de tres muestras independientes (Ntotal 
= 1.159) para averiguar si los resultados logran reproducirse. Se observa EC 
para las tres tareas atencionales, pero sólo hay ESC en la tarea de Stroop 
espacial. El efecto se mantiene después de eliminar del análisis los ensayos 
que son puras réplicas, un resultado inconsistente con las propuestas de 
Mayr et al. (2003) y Hommel (1998) pero congruente con la Teoría del Con-
flicto (Botvinick et al., 2001). Además, se analiza la importancia de la com-
plejidad cognitiva en relación a la perspectiva de Botvinick et al. (2004). 
Desde este punto de vista  una mayor complejidad se debería reflejar en 
una mayor presencia de conflicto cognitivo, y, por tanto, un mayor ESC.  
Palabras claves: Control atencional; conflicto cognitivo; efecto de compa-
tibilidad; efecto secuencial de compatibilidad. 
  Abstract: The modulation of the Compatibility Effect (CE) according to the 
compatibility of the previous trial (Sequential Compatibility Effect, SCE) in 
three types of attentional tasks is explored. The flankers and spatial Stroop 
tasks have different degrees of cognitive complexity. In all three tasks it is 
analyzed whether the SCE varies when the stimuli in consecutive trials are 
exactly the same (pure replicas) or not. The data, collected from three in-
dependent samples (total N = 1.159), show the CE in the three tasks. 
However, SCE only shows up in the spatial Stroop task. The effect is 
smaller albeit still significant when the pure replica trials are removed, a re-
sult inconsistent with those of Mayr et al. (2003) and Hommel (1998) but 
consistent with the Conflict Theory (Botvinick et al., 2001). Furthermore, we 
also discuss the importance of cognitive complexity in relation to the per-
spective of Botvinick et al. (2004). From this point of view more complexi-
ty should be reflected in a greater presence of cognitive conflict, and there-
fore a higher SCE. 
Key words: Attentional control; cognitive conflict; compatibility effect; se-
quential compatibility effect. 
 
Introduction  
 
Cognitive Control 
 
Baddeley (2002) defined Attentional Control as the ability 
to focalize attention, a feature of the central executive. 
Engle, Kane and Tuholski (1999) consider it as an ability to 
maintain active mental representations when there is inter-
ference or cognitive conflict. Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, and Cohen (2001) describe the cognitive control as a 
cognitive system ability that helps to configure itself in order 
to achieve better results in especially changing situations in 
which there is conflict or competition between different 
stimuli. Therefore, cognitive control is considered by many 
authors as a top-down process that regulates external infor-
mation. 
It is a common result in speeded experimental tasks that 
it takes less time responding to trials in which only the rele-
vant stimuli are presented (to be answered) than trials in 
which the relevant stimuli are accompanied with irrelevant 
stimuli (not to be answered). The presence of irrelevant 
stimuli produces cognitive conflict in the second kind of tri-
als. The cognitive system fails in processing information se-
lectively, i.e., it is unable to ignore not attending irrelevant 
stimuli (Botella, 1997, 1998). But there are individual differ-
ences. Those with better performance on tasks that tax in 
Attentional Control have greater ability for cognitive control 
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over the stimuli. Therefore, they attenuate more the pro-
cessing of irrelevant stimuli or at least they achieve that its 
processing does not interfere with the processing of the rel-
evant stimuli. 
Tasks measuring Attentional Control usually show some 
conflict between the stimuli relevant to the task and the ir-
relevant stimuli. Some examples are the Stroop task, the Si-
mon effect and the flankers task. Considering the difference 
between the mean reaction time (RT) of relevant and irrele-
vant trials and their order of presentation, we can define two 
types of measures of cognitive conflict: Compatibility Effect 
and Sequential Compatibility Effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 
1992).  
 
Compatibility Effect (CE) 
 
The flankers paradigm was developed by Eriksen and 
Eriksen (1974) to study the ability to select relevant infor-
mation in a spatial localization task. Its most common form 
presents two types of items: (a) one is the target and is locat-
ed at the center of the display, and (b) other (flankers) are 
displayed at both sides of the target; they should be ignored. 
In the condition of compatible flankers, the target and the 
flankers have the same identity, and therefore have the same 
response associated. In the condition of incompatible flank-
ers, both have different identity and different response asso-
ciated. Finally, in the condition of neutral flankers both have 
different identity and the flankers have no response associat-
ed. For example, if the letters used are H-S-V and the task is 
to press a key when the middle letter is S and press another 
key different when the middle letter is H, there are six types 
of presentations: HHHHH, SSSSS, HHSHH, SSHSS, 
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VVHVV and VVSVV. The first two trials are compatible, 
the next two are incompatible and the last two are neutral. 
The main result with this task is that the mean RT in the 
compatible condition is shorter than in the other two condi-
tions, while the mean RT in the incompatible condition is 
larger than in the others two; this is known as the Compatibil-
ity Effect (CE). In this study, the CE is operationally defined 
as the difference between the mean RT in the incompatible 
(RTI) and compatible (RTC) conditions: 
 
CE = RTI  -  RTC        (1) 
 
According to the zoom-lens model for spatial selective 
attention, we have the ability to adjust the size of the atten-
tional focus according to the task goals (Barriopedro & Bo-
tella, 1998; Erkisen & St. James, 1986; Eriksen & Yeh, 
1985). However, the flankers effect reflect a limitation in 
such ability, in the same vein as many other functions of the 
selective attention show limitations. 
For the Simon task (Simon & Rudell, 1967) it is manipu-
lated the correspondence between the position of the stimu-
lus and the response position. For example, the target could 
be a letter (A or B) that can appear to the left or right of the 
center of the screen. The task is pressing as fast as possible 
the left button when the letter A is presented, and the right 
button when the letter B is presented, regardless of at which 
side of the fixation point the letter appears. The usual result 
is that the mean RT is smaller when the spatial location of 
the stimulus and the response position match, i.e., when the 
letter A is presented at the left of the fixation point (compat-
ible trial) the RT is smaller than when it appears at the right 
of the fixation point (incompatible trial). Therefore, what is 
produced is a CE based on the stimulus-response spatial 
correspondence. 
 
Sequential Compatibility Effect  
 
The Sequential Effect (Bertelson, 1961) refers to the fact 
that the RT in a serial choice task is not independent of what 
happened in the previous trials. The response to a stimulus 
is different when the same stimulus is repeated on consecu-
tive trials than when it changes. Soetens, Boer and Hueting 
(1985) found that the RT decreases when the same stimulus 
is repeated in several consecutive trials, and increase when 
the stimuli alternate. 
Two independent mechanisms have been proposed to 
explain the sequential effects in a choice task with two alter-
natives: automatic facilitation and subjective expectancy. The auto-
matic facilitation mechanism predicts that exactly equal stimuli 
(pure replicas) must increase performance (smaller RT) as 
compared with alternating sequences. The subjective expectation 
mechanism assumes that some hypothesis is set by the ob-
server before the stimulus is presented. The empirical result, 
repeatedly observed, is that with short intervals between 
stimuli (≈ 100 ms) repetitions are facilitators, and the results 
are explained by automatic facilitation. However, when the 
interval is long repetitions increase the RT, and the subjec-
tive expectation is the mechanism that accounts the results. 
This matches with the view that the expectation is a top-
down process, controlled by the cognitive system, so it 
needs more time. By contrast, the facilitation is a bottom-up 
process, controlled by the stimuli, requiring less time to ob-
serve its effects (e.g., Soetens, 1998; Soetens & Notebaert, 
2005). 
Gratton et al. (1992) were pioneers in studying the se-
quential effects using the paradigm of flankers of Eriksen 
and Eriksen (1974). As Soetens (1985), they employed a two 
alternative choice task to study sequential effects. However, 
in each trial the target was flanked by distracter stimuli, irrel-
evant for the task, but that could be compatible, incompati-
ble, or neutral, in the sense of the Eriksens’ paradigm. The 
main novelty of Gratton et al. (1992) is that they studied 
how the CE changes as a function of the condition of com-
patibility in the previous trial. That is, the effects of repeti-
tion or alternation of the condition of compatibility in con-
secutive trials (N and N-1) in a flankers task of letters. Four 
types of sequences must be distinguished: compatible trial 
preceded by a compatible trial (cC), compatible trial preced-
ed by an incompatible trial (iC), incompatible trial preceded 
by another incompatible trial (iI) and incompatible trial pre-
ceded by a compatible trial (cI). Stimuli were displayed for 
100 ms with an inter-stimulus interval between 3500 and 
5500 ms. Their results agree with what is usually observed: 
the RT is shorter in compatible than in incompatible trials 
(the CE). Their main result was that the CE was modulated 
by the condition of compatibility of the previous trial. Spe-
cifically, the CE was smaller when the previous trial was in-
compatible as compared with trials preceded by compatible 
trials, a phenomenon that has been labeled Sequential Compat-
ibility Effect (SCE). 
The procedure for estimating the size of the SCE is as 
follows: 
 
SCE = (RTcI – RTcC) – (RTiI – RTiC)     (2) 
 
Gratton et al. (1992) argue that these results cannot be 
explained by the facilitation caused by repetition of the pre-
vious trial on the current trial, but by the repetition of the 
compatibility condition. The expectation created by the type 
of compatibility of previous trial influences on the response 
given in the current trial. 
Botvinick et al. (2001) and Botvinick, Cohen and Carter 
(2004) try to explain the results of Gratton et al. (1992) 
through the concept of Cognitive Control. They wonder how it 
is managed the conflict that occurs in tasks in which stimuli 
are associated with two different types of responses, as in 
the flankers and Simon tasks.  
Botvinick et al. (2001) proposed the Conflict Monitoring 
Theory according to which there is a system that monitors the 
presence of conflict compensating the system to reduce the 
impact of conflict as follows: first, the system evaluates the 
levels of conflict, then transfers the information to the cen-
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ters of cognitive control and, finally, set the system to try to 
prevent or reduce conflict. The activation of competitive re-
sponses (in incompatible or incongruent conditions) increase 
the top-down control of the cognitive system on the infor-
mation processing. Botvinick et al. (2001) propose a compu-
tational model of neural networks to explain the conflict 
monitoring in a wide range of behavioral contexts. The main 
feature of this model, as compared to other similar models 
(Cohen & Huston, 1994; Cohen, Servan-Schreiber & 
McClelland, 1992; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981), is the 
conflict monitoring unit responsible for reducing or manag-
ing cognitive conflict. The explanation for the SCE is as fol-
lows: incompatible trials produce more cognitive activation 
than compatible ones, since in the incompatible trials there 
is more conflict. The increased level of control is still active 
when the stimuli of the following trial are presented. Thus, 
the RT in iI is shorter as compared to when the sequence is 
compatible followed by incompatible (cI), because compati-
ble trials require less activation and, therefore, the following 
trial begins with a lower level of activation. 
One of the features of the theory of Botvinick et al. 
(2001) is that they have been seeking for neural correlates of 
the presence of conflict in experimental tasks. They argue 
that activation of anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) can be 
considered a reaction to the occurrence of conflict and is 
expected to be greater the longer the conflict. Egner and 
Hirsch (2005), MacDonald III, Cohen, Stenger and Carter 
(2000) and Kerns et al. (2004) observed increased activation 
of the ACC in trials with greater conflict (incompatible) in a 
Stroop task; Van Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger and 
Carter (2001) found increased activation in the ACC in the 
presence of incompatible trials in a flankers task. However, 
they also found contrary results, observing a lack of relation-
ship between ACC and the presence of conflict in flankers 
tasks (Casey et al., 2000), Stroop tasks (Milham & Banich, 
2005) and Simon tasks (Burle, Allain, Vidal & Hasbroucq, 
2005). 
In their review of the Conflict Monitoring Theory Botvinick 
et al. (2004) suggest that conflict can be an index of cogni-
tive demands to make a mental effort, as there is evidence 
that the ACC is more active in cognitively loaded tasks. 
Moreover, they argue that the conflict can occur at different 
levels of information processing, from perceptual represen-
tation to the categorization of stimuli, through the selection 
of information and representation. 
Mayr, Awh and Laurey (2003) suggest that the SCE can 
be explained by Perceptual Priming and, therefore, the 
processing would not be top-down, guided by the cognitive 
system, but bottom-up, guided by the stimulus. The 
repetition of the same stimulus in consecutive trials may 
explain the lower RT in incompatible trials preceded by 
another incompatible (iI) when the interval between the 
stimuli is short (1000 ms). In this study, when the analysis 
eliminates consecutive trials with exactly the same stimuli 
(pure replicas) of a spatial flankers task, the SCE disappears. 
Examples of pure replicas would be: N-1 (<<<) and N 
(<<<), N-1 (><>) and N (><>); and trials in which the 
condition of compatibility is repeated but the stimuli are not 
exact replicas are, for example: N-1 (<<<) and N (>>>), 
N-1 (><>) and N (<><). Notice that pure replicas trials 
only are possible in the sequences cC and iI. However, 
Ullsperger, Bylsma and Botvinick (2005) performed two 
experiments: in one of them eliminated repeated stimuli in a 
spatial flankers task, and in the other designed numerical 
flankers in which there is no pair of repeated stimuli; SCE is 
found in both experiments, although it should be 
highlighted that the interval between the stimuli is superior 
to that employed by Mayr et al. (2003), since it is between 
5000-6000 ms for the spatial task and between 3500-5000 
ms for the numerical task. Another difference between the 
study of Mayr et al. (2003) and Ullsperger et al. (2005) is that 
in the study of Mayr et al (2003) the stimulus remains on the 
screen until the response, while in that of Ullsperger et al 
(2005) the stimulus disappears after 100-377 ms. That is, 
Mayr et al. (2003) employed tasks that facilitate priming 
between stimuli, holding the stimulus the maximum time on 
the screen. 
Some authors, using shorter intervals between stimuli as 
those employed by Mayr et al. (2003) found SCE, while 
others do not. On one hand, Notebaert, Gevers, 
Verbruggen and Liefooghe (2006) studied the SCE in a 
Stroop task with different intervals between 50 and 200 ms 
stimuli and leaving the stimulus on the screen until a 
response was given. They found this effect clearly, both 
when all trials were included in the analysis and when the 
pure replicas were removed. Moreover, the CE disappeared 
completely when the previous trial was incompatible and the 
interval was 50 ms. Also, Notebaert and Verguts (2007) ana-
lyzed the results of a flankers task with an interval of 800 ms 
between stimuli and found that trials in which there was no 
repetition contributed significantly to explain the presence 
of cognitive conflict in the task, which contradicts the view-
point of Mayr et al. (2003). Furthermore, Nieuwenhuis et al. 
(2006) used tasks of arrows as flankers with a stimulus inter-
val of 1.000 ms and with the following variations. First, pre-
senting the flankers 100 ms before the target and then keep-
ing them near the target on the screen until a response is 
given, so that there were greater conflict between the flank-
ers and the target. Second, emphasizing in the instructions 
the speed in the response; they should make the response as 
quickly as possible, even although mistakes are committed 
(another way to increase the conflict), and providing trial-to-
trial feedback of the responses. Furthermore, in order to as-
sess the degree of generalization at different ages, they ap-
plied a flankers task of arrows where the stimulus was pre-
sented for 800 ms and with an interval of 2500 ms between 
stimuli to a group of 892 participants of 12, 25 and 50 years 
old. Despite all these changes, they obtained the same results 
in the flankers task that Mayr et al. (2003), i.e., the SCE dis-
appears when pure replicas are removed from the analysis. 
Hommel and his colleagues (1998, 2004, 2007), in their 
Feature Integration Theory, presents an approach consistent 
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with that of  Mayr et al. (2003) that explains the SCE as a 
priming effect. Hommel argues that if a response and a stimu-
lus co-occur in time their characteristics get associated or in-
tegrated. Therefore, the activation of one member of the as-
sociation tends to activate the other member, resulting in a 
benefit or stimulus-response priming. That is, if the stimulus 
is presented to the left of the screen as in a Simon task, and 
the correct answer in this case is pressing a key on the left of 
the keyboard (or with the left hand), the RT will be smaller 
due to the association between the position of the stimulus 
and the associated response. However, if the stimulus is pre-
sented to the left and the correct answer is to press a button 
on the right, the presence of the stimulus to the left auto-
matically activate the response of the left, so it will increase 
the RT. Simon task using intervals between stimuli of 1000 
ms and manipulating the presentation time on the screen of 
stimuli with values of 400 and 1500, Hommel, Proctor and 
Vu (2004) found CE in the trial N when the trial N-1 was 
compatible, but not when it was incompatible. Therefore, 
they found SCE. However, when examining the effects of 
repeated stimulus-response localization discovered that the 
CE would disappear if there was alternating trials of the 
stimulus-response location, so that the results can be ex-
plained in terms of Feature Integration Theory. These results 
were similar to the results of Wendt, Kluwe and Peters 
(2006). Conversely, Wühr and Ansorge (2005) applied a Si-
mon task presenting the stimuli during 250 ms. Manipulating 
the interval between stimuli with values of 1500, 2600 and 
6000 ms obtained SCE in all three cases, although this de-
creases as the interval is increased and, moreover, the SCE 
was unaffected by repetition or alternation stimulus-
response, a result that contradicts the predictions of Hom-
mel (1998, 2004, 2007). 
In summary, there are three main theoretical approaches 
to the sequential effects observed in experimental tasks of 
response competition (cognitive conflict): Conflict Monitoring 
Theory (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004), Perceptual Priming (Mayr 
et al., 2003) and Feature Integration Theory (Hommel, 1998, 
2004). Botvinick links the SCE to the presence of cognitive 
conflict between relevant and irrelevant stimuli. The other 
two interpreted the SCE either as an effect of repeated trials 
with exactly the same stimuli, arguing that it is a methodo-
logical artifact rather than a relevant empirical evidence 
(Mayr et al, 2003), or as the result of a spatial stimulus-
response correspondence and representations of stimulus-
response features (Hommel, 1998).  
 
The aim 
 
Our main objective is to analyze the effect of the modu-
lation of CE according to the compatibility of the previous 
trial of a sequence of trials on three attentional tasks of cog-
nitive conflict: two flankers tasks (verbal and numerical) and 
a spatial Stroop. Flankers tasks have higher cognitive com-
plexity than spatial. Cognitive complexity is an important 
dimension to explain how they are approached by the partic-
ipants (Arend, Colom, Botella, Contreras, Rubio & San-
tacreu, 2003). While in the flankers tasks the association be-
tween stimuli (numbers or letters) and the response is arbi-
trary, which requires the subject to process this association 
in a controlled manner, in the spatial Stroop task the loca-
tion of the stimuli (left or right) and of the two response 
keys (press with left or right hand) is not arbitrary, involving 
more automatic processing. Therefore, in the flankers tasks 
there is an operation that is not present in the spatial Stroop 
task, which makes the last one less complex. 
We also examine whether the SCE is modulated by exact 
repetitions of the same stimuli (pure replicas). That is, we 
examine whether these three tasks show the SCE found by 
Gratton et al. (1992) and will be compared with predictions 
from the three models. The attentional tasks were applied to 
three independent samples composed of a total of 1,159 par-
ticipants.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were recruited from three consecutive co-
horts of students of size 379, 358 and 422, with mean age of 
20.28 years (SD = 2.70), 20.35 years (SD = 3.17), and 20.35 
years (SD = 3.17), respectively. The total sample comprised 
approximately 80% of females, uniformly distributed in the 
three samples. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli 
 
Stimuli were presented on a monitor connected to a PC. 
The experiment was programmed in Visual Basic 6.0 by the 
first author (J.P.). Stimuli subtended 0.64° high and 0.29° 
wide, presented at 50 cm distance. The font used for the 
stimuli was Courier New Bold size 20. The color of the 
stimuli was black [RGB (0, 0, 0)], while the background was 
cyan [RGB (150, 200, 250)]. 
The Spatial Stroop task consisted of the presentation of an 
arrow, at the left or right of a central cross (fixation point), 
that could point to the left or right. Specifically, there could 
be four types of trials: < +  ,  + > , > +  ,  + < . The partic-
ipant had to press a key quickly with the left hand if the ar-
row was pointing to the left and another key with the right 
hand if it was oriented to the right, regardless of the side of 
the central cross where the arrow appeared. Therefore, the 
first two types of trials were compatible and the last two tri-
als were incompatible. 
The Numerical Flankers task consisted of three digits 
presented in the center of the screen. The central digit could 
be the same or different than the digit at the sides. Digits 1 
to 9 were used as stimuli. There are four types of trials, 
according to the category (odd or even) of the target and the 
flankers: EEE, OOO, EOE, OEO. The compatible trials 
were always of identical type. That is, when the target and 
the flankers were both odd or even, they were the same 
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digit. The task was to press a key as fast as possible with one 
hand when the central digit was odd and with the other hand 
when it was even. 
The Verbal Flankers task consisted of three letters 
presented in the center of the screen. The center letter could 
be the same or different than those at the sides. The stimuli 
used were the five vowels and the following five consonants: 
G, K, S, P, X. All were presented in uppercase. The four 
types of trials in this task, according to the category of the 
letter, were: VVV, CCC, VCV, CVC. As in the previous task 
compatible trials were always of identical type. The 
participant's task was to press a key quickly with one hand 
when the central letter was a vowel and with the other hand 
when it was a consonant. 
Note that while in the flankers tasks the association 
between the stimulus and the response is arbitrary, which 
require controlled processing, in the Stroop spatial task the 
association between stimuli and responses involves a more 
automatic processing. Thus we can consider flankers tasks as 
cognitively more complex than the spatial Strrop task. 
 
Procedure  
 
The procedure in the three types of tasks was identical 
except for the type of stimulus presented in each case (see 
Figure 1). Participants were placed at about 50 cm from the 
screen. Each trial began with the fixation point (a cross) for 
1000 ms, in the center of the screen. Then the stimuli were 
displayed and remained on the screen until the participants’ 
response by pressing the 1 or 0 on the keyboard; then, the 
screen remained empty for 1000 ms. Therefore, the interval 
between stimulus (from the moment when the stimuli of a 
trial disappeared until the stimuli of the next trial appeared) 
was 2000 ms. The total duration of a trial was variable, as it 
depended of the response time in the trial. The experimental 
condition and the specific stimuli for each trial were ran-
domly determined for each participant just before the be-
ginning of the trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic sequence of the procedure for the three experimental 
tasks. 
 
All participants performed, for each task, a practice 
block of 20 trials and an experimental block of 80 trials (40 
compatible and 40 incompatible trials). The total time spent 
performing the three tasks was about 20 minutes in a single 
session. All tasks were administered to all participants (see 
an exception below). For all trials of each condition the 
trimmed average RT was calculated: RT ≤ 200 ≤ 2000 ms, 
using only the trials with a correct response. Trimmed aver-
age is used to eliminate trials that are probably anticipations 
(< 200 ms) and trials in which the participant was probably 
distracted (> 2000 ms). 
 
Design 
 
The experimental design was within-subjects, since all 
participants performed all experimental conditions. In the 
case of the first sample they were applied only the Numeri-
cal Flankers task and the spatial Stroop. The letters task was 
only employed with the other two samples. The order of ap-
plication of the tasks was the same for all participants: first, 
the Verbal Flankers, then the Numerical Flankers, and final-
ly the spatial Stroop. 
 
Results 
 
In order to explore whether the SCE is due to priming pro-
duced by the previous trial (N-1) in the current trial (N), 
there were two types of analysis: including all trials and elim-
inating those that were pure replicas. We conducted repeat-
ed measures ANOVAs 2x2 for mean RT of the four types 
of trials depending of two factors: the compatibility of the 
present trial, N (compatible or incompatible) and the com-
patibility of the previous trial, N-1 (compatible or incompat-
ible). These four values appear in formula (2) which reflects 
the magnitude of the SCE: RTcI, RTcC, RTiI, RTiC. In that 
formula RTcI is the average RT of the incompatible trials 
preceded by a compatible trial and RTiI is the mean of in-
compatible trials preceded by an incompatible trial (RTcC 
and RTiC follow the same logic). 
 
Spatial Stroop 
 
The results of the ANOVA indicate that the main factor, 
trial N compatibility, is statistically significant when all trials 
are included in the analysis, for the first sample [F(1,377) = 
553.21, p < .001, partial η2 = .595], the second sample 
[F(1,477) = 1,008.08, p < .001, partial η2 = .679] and the 
third sample [F(1,416) = 708.03, p < .001, partial η2 = .630]. 
When pure replicas are eliminated, the results are also statis-
tically significant in all cases: first sample, F(1,377) = 441.29, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .539]; second sample, F(1,476) = 
739.54, p < .001, partial η2 = .608; third sample, F(1,416) = 
479.35, p < .001, partial η2 = .535. In all these comparisons 
the direction of the effect is as expected. That is, in the spa-
tial Stroop RTI is significantly higher than RTC and, there-
fore, the CE appears both when all trials are included (CE = 
 
 
 
 
AAA 
1000 
ms 
 
 
+ 
Response 
1000 ms 
692                                                                   Jesús Privado et al. 
 
anales de psicología, 2015, vol. 31, nº 2 (mayo) 
51 ms for the total sample) and when pure replicas are elim-
inated (CE = 54 ms for the total sample). The effect size 
(partial η2) is larger than .50 in all comparisons. The statistical 
partial η2 is interpreted as the proportion of variance of the 
dependent variable explained by the factor: here, the com-
patibility of the present trial explains more than 50% of the 
variance. 
To check if there is SCE in the spatial Stroop the interac-
tion between the two factors (compatibility in trials N and 
N-1) must be evaluated. The interaction is statistically signif-
icant, both when all trials are included and when the pure 
replicas are eliminated. Specifically, the results with all trials 
are: first sample, F(1,377) = 711.64, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.654; second sample, F(1,477) = 782.48, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.621; third sample, F(1,416) = 412.46, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.498. When pure replicas are eliminated the results of the 
three samples are: first sample, F(1,377) = 259.77, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .408; second sample, F(1,477) = 141.99, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .230; third sample, F(1,416) = 113.23, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .214. The effect size is larger for the all trials 
analysis (.498 to .654) than for the analysis without pure rep-
licas (.214 to .408). That is, the SCE explains a large amount 
of variance in the RTs even when pure replicas are excluded. 
The nature of the interaction is shown in Figure 2: the 
CE is smaller when the previous trial is incompatible then 
when the previous trial is compatible. Specifically, the aver-
ages of compatible trials are always smaller than the averages 
in the incompatible trials. However, the lines are closer to-
gether when the previous trials are incompatible when they 
are compatible. 
The SCE decreases when trials with pure replicas are 
eliminated (81 ms with all trials and 50 ms without the repli-
cas, with the total sample), but the interaction is still signifi-
cant. This result suggests that the SCE is not due solely to 
Perceptual Priming. Furthermore the result is robust, since the 
presence of SCE in the spatial Stroop is replicated in three 
independent samples. 
 
Verbal Flankers  
 
Analogous ANOVAs to those in the previous section 
but with the mean RT obtained with the letters flankers task 
yielded the following results. The main factor trial N com-
patibility is statistically significant when all trials are included 
in the analysis for the second sample [F(1,477) = 463.28, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .493] and the third sample [F(1,416) = 
966.65, p < .001, partial η2 = .699]. When pure replicas are 
eliminated the results are: second sample, F(1,477) = 388.76, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .449; third sample, F(1,416) = 787.30, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .654. In the verbal flankers task, as in the 
spatial Stroop, the mean RTI is significantly higher than the 
mean RTC; therefore, the CE shows up both with all trials 
(41 ms for the total sample) and eliminating the pure replicas 
(40 ms for the total sample). The observed partial η2 statistic 
value allows concluding that the CE in this task explains 
more than 45% of the variance in the RT of the verbal 
flankers task. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean RTs in the spatial Stroop for trials with and without repli-
cas, according to the compatibility of trial N (compatible or incompatible) 
and trial N-1 (compatible or incompatible) for the three samples: a, b and c. 
 
Examining the interaction of the two factors (compati-
bility of trials N and N-1) of the ANOVA for Verbal Flank-
ers allows checking the presence of SCE in this task. The re-
sults for the two samples analyzed with all trials indicate a 
statistically significant interaction for the second sample 
[F(1,477) = 15.96, p < .001, partial η2 = .032], but not for the 
third sample [F(1,416) = 2.98, p = .085, partial η2 = .007], 
although the effect size in the first case is very small. If pure 
replicas are removed from the analysis, the results are not 
significant neither for the second sample [F(1,477) = 2.96, p 
= .086, partial η2 = .006] nor for the third sample [F(1,416) = 
0.08, p = .784, partial η2 < .001]. The absence of a significant 
interaction in the verbal flankers indicates that the CE 
reaches equivalent sizes when the previous trial is compati-
ble or incompatible. 
Figure 3 shows that the lines are almost parallel in the 
two samples, especially when deleting from the analysis the 
trials that are pure replicas. So, unlike the spatial Stroop, in 
the verbal flankers task the SCE is not present. 
RT  
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Figure 3. Mean RTs in the verbal task for trials with and without replicas, 
according to the compatibility of trial N (compatible or incompatible) and 
trial N-1 (compatible or incompatible) for the second and third samples. 
 
Numerical Flankers 
 
ANOVAs analogous to those in the previous sections 
were applied to each of the three samples. When all trials are 
included the results are statistically significant in the first 
sample [F(1,376) = 344.38, p < .001, partial η2 = .478] and in 
the second sample [F(1,477) = 622.75, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.566]. We cannot provide the results of this analysis for the 
third sample because there were no replicas in this task for 
this sample. When pure replicas are eliminated the results 
are: first sample, F(1,376) = 296.59, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.441; second sample, F(1,477) = 490.74, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.507; third sample, F(1,416) = 432.40, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.510. That is, in the numerical flankers task the mean RTI is 
significantly higher than the mean RTC and, therefore, the 
CE is present in this task with all trials (42 ms for the total 
sample) and without the pure replicas pure (39 ms for the 
total sample). For the numerical flankers task approximately 
50% of the RT is explained by the compatibility in the pre-
sent trial. 
Again, we checked if the SCE is present in this task as-
sessing the significance of the interaction of the two com-
patibility factors (trials N and N-1) of the ANOVA. When 
all trials are included the interaction is statistically significant 
[F(1,376) = 4.51, p = .034, partial η2 = .012], with a very 
small effect size; but no significant in the second sample 
[F(1,477) = 3.23, p = .073, partial η2 = .007]. By eliminating 
the pure replicas from the analysis, in none of the three 
samples the result is statistically significant: first sample, 
F(1,376) = 0.73, p = .393, partial η2 = .002; second sample, 
F(1,477) = 3.15, p = .077, partial η2 = .007; third sample, 
F(1,416) = 3.70, p = .055, partial η2 = .009. 
As was the case in the verbal flankers task, the absence 
of interaction indicates that the CE is equivalent when the 
previous trial is incompatible as when the previous trial is 
compatible. Figure 4 shows that the lines are almost parallel 
in the three samples. Therefore, unlike the spatial Stroop the 
SCE is not observed in the flankers tasks. 
In summary, the results are partially replicated in the 
three samples and it seems that there are small differences in 
the CE among the three tasks. On the average, the CE in 
spatial Stroop is slightly higher (51-54 ms in the average, 
considering the three samples) compared to the CE with 
flankers tasks (39-42 ms half as large). In relation to the 
SCE, the effect is clearly higher in the spatial Stroop than in 
the flankers tasks, both when all the trials are included as 
when pure replicas are removed. In contrast, no difference 
was observed in the SCE between the Verbal and Numerical 
Flankers tasks. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean RTs in the numerical flankers task for trials with and with-
out replicas, according to the compatibility of trial N (compatible or incom-
patible) and trial N-1 (compatible or incompatible) for the three samples. 
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Discussion 
 
The results found, in three independent samples totaling 
1.159 participants, show the presence of CE in the three at-
tentional tasks used, two cognitive tasks of high complexity 
and one of low complexity. However, significant SCE was 
observed only in the low cognitive complexity tasks. This 
general result holds even when the trials that are pure repli-
cas are excluded, which contradicts the perspective of Mayr 
et al. (2003) and Hommel (1998), but supports Conflict Theory 
(Botvinick et al., 2001). However, the fact that the SCE does 
not appear in the more complex tasks contradicts Botvinick 
et al. (2004) in that the greater complexity should be reflect-
ed in a greater presence of cognitive conflict, by increasing 
top-down control. 
The results for the SCE in the spatial Stroop are difficult 
to explain if one assumes that the only relevant factor is the 
repetition of the stimulus-response spatial correspondence 
(Hommel, 1998) or priming of consecutive trials (Mayr et al., 
2003). However, the results can be interpreted more easily if 
it is accepted that is the condition of compatibility of the 
previous trial (as proposed in the Conflict Theory) the cause of 
the decrease in the CE when the previous trial was incom-
patible. Even after eliminating trials with pure replicas (that 
facilitated the reduction of RT) the SCE still occurs, as other 
authors found in this type of task (e.g., Wür & Ansorge, 
2005). In addition, remember that our interval between the 
stimuli and the duration of the stimuli on the screen are 
closer to those of Mayr et al. (2003) and Hommel (1998) and 
others have not found SCE when pure replicas are removed 
from the analysis (Hommel et al., 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 
2006; Wendt et al., 2006). Therefore, the presence of SCE 
reinforces the idea that the SCE is due mainly to the pres-
ence of conflict (Vergruggen, Notebaert, Liefooghe & 
Vandierendock, 2003, Fernández-Duque & Knight, 2008; 
Notebaert et al., 2006). However, there is a decrease of the 
SCE by eliminating pure replicas, which could support, in 
part, the points of view of Mayr et al. (2003) and Hommel 
(1998). In the spatial Stroop the SCE can be explained main-
ly by the presence of cognitive conflict, but repetition con-
tributes to some extent to that effect. 
Related to the flankers tasks, the absence of SCE could 
be interpreted from the Perceptual Priming Theory by the ab-
sence of repetition of the same trial consecutively (Mayr et 
al., 2003). According to this view, the processing would be 
guided by the stimuli (bottom-up) and by eliminating pure 
replicas trials the SCE disappears. In the flankers tasks of 
this study the probability of a repetition of the same stimuli 
in two consecutive trials was small as compared to those of 
Mayr et al. (2003), since these authors used four stimuli, 
whereas in our case we used many more (18 for numerical 
flankers task and 20 for verbal flankers task). This larger 
number of stimuli significantly reduced the likelihood of an 
exact repetition, and therefore, the opportunities of the SCE 
in flankers tasks are smaller (Gratton et al., 1992; Ullsperger 
et al., 2005; Verbruggen et al., 2006). 
The results of manipulating the cognitive complexity in 
tasks with conflict (to increase the processing top-down) are 
against the ideas of Botvinck et al. (2004). Indeed, in more 
complex tasks (flankers tasks) the SCE was not observed, 
while in the less complex cognitive (spatial Stroop) there was 
a clear SCE. One possible explanation may lie in the stimuli 
used here in the flankers tasks. They usually employ only 
two or three stimuli, whereas in the present research we 
used more stimuli, although the aim of including more stim-
uli was to increase the complexity of the task. Our results are 
consistent with those of Stümer, Seiss and Leuthold (2005), 
who found the SCE only in the spatial Stroop and not in the 
flankers and go/no-go tasks, but these authors did not ma-
nipulate top-down the processing in these latest tasks and 
presented the three types of tasks together alternating spatial 
Stroop trials with flanker trials or go/no-go trials. Fernan-
dez-Duque and Knight (2008) did manipulate the top-down 
processing, finding that when this processing was clearly 
top-down the ESC was observed in their Stroop tasks, but it 
did not show up when the processing was bottom-up. These 
results are contrary to the results obtained here, although the 
way they manipulate the processing was different. They give 
to the participants a cue about the probability of congruency 
between the trials. Furthermore, they presented the Stroop 
tasks in alternating trials.  
The finding of SCE in only one of the three tasks is con-
trary to the idea of a general cognitive mechanism responsi-
ble for managing the conflict, as proposed by the Conflict 
Monitoring Theory (Botvinick et al., 2001). On the contrary, it 
converges with other approaches that support the idea that 
the cognitive system handles the conflict specifically accord-
ing to the task (Kunde & Wühr, 2006; Wendt et al., 2006). 
An intermediate position is that of Fernandez-Duque and 
Knight (2008), who proposed that in the early stages of un-
derstanding-habituation the task is more top-down, whereas 
once the task has been automated the processing is more 
bottom-up. Our results do not converge with this point of 
view, because the tasks that need more time for automation 
should be the most complex cognitive, being precisely those 
that did not show the SCE, as would be expected if the pro-
cessing had been top-down. 
Another way to test the idea of a general attentional con-
trol mechanism has been to observe how the CE modulates 
between tasks. Both Fernandez-Duque and Knight (2008) as 
Stümer et al. (2005) alternated different tasks in the trials 
within a block. The results of both studies show that this 
provides modulation of a task on the other, that is, the CE 
of a task depends on the type of trial (compatible or incom-
patible) from the task of the previous trait. These data have 
been interpreted as the presence of a nonspecific mechanism 
of task type, as argued Botvinick et al. (2001). But it would 
be necessary to perform an experiment in which trials alter-
nate high and low cognitive complexity to check this idea 
with tasks of the type employed in the present study. 
We should also note the possibility that the variability of 
the results may be associated with the differences between 
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the tasks used in the several dozen of published experiments 
studying the SCE. We believe that both the CE and the SCE 
are robust enough to hold under small variations in the ex-
perimental paradigm. However, it is possible that some of its 
characteristics interact with manipulations and produce sig-
nificant differential effects. It remains for future experiments 
the systematic study of those effects. 
In summary, the three tasks used showed the CE, but in 
the high cognitive complexity tasks the EC was not modu-
lated by the condition of compatibility of the previous trial 
(compatible or incompatible), as was observed in the low-
complexity task. None of the theoretical proposals explains 
fully the results found. The SCE in the spatial Stroop can be 
explained mainly by the Conflict Monitoring Theory, and to a 
lesser extent by Perceptual Priming Theory and Feature Integration 
Theory. However, the absence of SCE in the two tasks with 
greater cognitive complexity contradicts the presence of a 
general mechanism that monitors the conflict, as argued by 
the Conflict Monitoring Theory. The fact that none of the theo-
ries completely accounts the general pattern of results sug-
gests that there may be a factor not explicitly considered in 
the studies reviewed here: the presence of substantial indi-
vidual differences when facing tasks of attentional conflict 
(Braver, Cole & Yarkoni, 2010). It is possible that different 
theoretical perspectives are relevant to explain the response 
patterns of certain individuals but not others? We believe 
this is a possibility that may be worth exploring in future 
studies. 
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